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BOOK REVIEW

THE ILLUSION OF EQUAIITY: THE RHETORIC AND REAI.ITY OF

By Martha A. Fineman. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press. 1991. Pp. 240. Hardcover. $27.00.
DIVORCE REFORM,

Reviewed by Judge LaDoris Cordell*

FINEMAN vs. KRAMER
A story once circulated about Clare Booth Luce, the onetime
playwright, wife of Henry Luce, and ambassador to Italy. The Pope,
it was reported, had agreed to give an audience to Ms. Luce, a fervent Catholic convert. Ms. Luce appeared at the Vatican as scheduled and presented herself to the Assistant Pope (hereinafter AP),
who escorted her into the Pope's chambers. The AP then resumed
his post outside the Pope's quarters. An hour passed, and Ms. Luce
did not emerge. After yet another hour without sign of Ms. Luce,
the AP's curiousity could no longer be contained. He inched open
the door. There stood Ms. Luce facing the pontiff, his arms spreadeagle, his back flattened against the wall. "But Mrs. Luce," intoned
the Pope desperately, "I am a Catholic!"?
This anecdote came frequently to my mind as I labored through
Martha Fineman's The Illusion of Equality. Throughout the book
the author clearly asserts her commitment to policies that ensure that
a woman's station in life not be reduced after divorce. Moreover, she
believes that in those instances where mothers have assumed the role
of primary caretaker and have been found to be fit parents, custody
of minor children should most logically be given to them. Over and
over and over again, Fineman takes the purveyors of divorce to task
for their mistreatment of women and children. "But Professor
Fineman," the reader desperately intones, "I am a believer in
women and children." Rather than enlisting the reader to engage in
the good fight against a system admittedly fraught with problems,
Judge, Superior Court of Santa Clara County; B.A., 1971, Antioch College; J.D.,
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the nakedness of Fineman's anger serves to keep the reader distracted and distanced.
This being said, Fineman does make some good points. She
presents a cogent and clear discussion of the recent history of divorce
reform. She demonstrates, in convincing fashion, that no-fault divorce unexpectedly undermined women's power to negotiate reasonable divorce settlements. "A wife typically had leverage under a fault
system because a husband seeking divorce needed the wife's cooperation to go through the motions of showing fault in court. The innocent spouse could withhold cooperation until a satisfactory settlement
was offered." Thus were the good intentions that underlay the divorce reform movement transformed into bad outcomes for women.
I found the distinctions Fineman draws between "rule," or formal equality, and result-equality to be particularly useful. Professor
Fineman is concerned that in their attempt to render the law genderneutral, feminists have promoted rule-equality, which purports to
render men and women equal bargaining partners in divorce court.
However, as she points out, "To understand why a rule-equality
approach is inappropriate, we must consider three related factors:
women's unequal social and economic position in society, the ways in
which marriage and family decisions are affected by these and other
economic and social circumstances, and the impact of divorce on
women with dependent children."
The author endorses rules that focus on result-equality.
Such rules are constituted to take into account the different
structural positions of women and men in our society and seek
to achieve parity in position between individuals. Result-equality is a more instrumental approach to restructuring the relationships between men and women and may require that these
groups be treated differently in order that they end up on the
same level.
As an aside, I was struck by the parallels between Professor
Fineman's framing of this issue and the development of civil rights
law. The doctrine of separate but equal was a rule-equality based
solution to past inequity. Having proved itself to be a bankrupt concept, it was replaced by affirmative action, a result-based model. Unfortunately, in the political struggle now surrounding affirmative action with regard both to race and sex, the distinction between ruleequality and result-equality has been too frequently blurred.
On another subject, Professor Fineman reminds us that, like legal rules, all social science data is not created equal, and that care
must be taken in interpreting even the most serious studies. She
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takes social scientists to task for implying that their work is objective
and free of bias, when, at the very least, what is studied and how it
is studied, is immediately affected by the researchers' biases. It is
unfortunate, as she points out, that the scientific naivete of the legal
profession results in the implementation of policy predicated on an
unexamined acceptance of questionable research.
Another of Fineman's concerns is the institution of mediation,
about which she writes at considerable length. Not only does she
register her concern about the process of mediating domestic disputes, she goes one step further and details how the introduction of
mental health professionals into family law has transformed the way
in which we conceptualize divorce. Prior to its reform, she notes,
divorce was understood to be simply the termination of a contract.
The function of the legal system was to finalize the mop up and
preside at the demise of a marriage. With the introduction of psychology, divorce developed into an ongoing process, with no end in
sight.
Currently, the language of the helping professions portrays divorce as an "emotional crisis" that must be treated but can also
provide some "unique opportunities for growth".

. .

. The goal

of the helping professional is to bring the parties to the recognition that the "structural dimensions" of their former marital
system have not disappeared, but must be reshaped into a new,
though limited, "post-dissolution organization." This new organization is based on the relationship between the parents-now ex-spouses-with parent-child relationships as "subsystems" within this paradigm.
An outgrowth of this "new organization," has been the adoption
by the courts of the presumption of joint custody, a presumption
Professor Fineman deplores, and for good cause. It has been my experience as a family court judge, that for those parents for whom
cooperative parenting is feasible, joint custody orders are unnecessary. And for those couples whose disaffection impinges on their
ability to agree on issues of child rearing, joint custody becomes the
basis for ongoing strife. Parental harmony is a mandate which simply cannot be implemented. Hence the paradox of joint custody-them for whom it works, don't need it; while them for whom
it don't, do. Mercifully, the State of California has seen the light and
eliminated the joint custody presumption.
Having convinced us that divorce American style is a dark, unremitting morass, Professor Fineman disappoints us with superficial
suggestions for change. Immediately the reader is struck by the fact
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that of the 200 pages in this book, only 16 are devoted to proposals
for reform, and these suggestions are skimpy. The changes she promotes include (1)reinstituting the primary caretaker presumption in
custody cases, (2) redefining the role of the child advocate, (3) viewing social science data with a healthy degree of skepticism, and (4)
moving away from dispute resolution procedure with a return to the
adversarial model.
In contrast to the insightful and considered criticisms she levels
at divorce reform, her proposed solutions are prosaic and ill-conceived. As an example, I have concerns about the changes she proposes in the role of the child advocate. She suggests that the advocate
"could perform a public function by lobbying forr the replacement of
the best interest test with a more determinative substantive rule
. ... " By so doing, the advocate becomes a legislator, a function

completely inappropriate in the family court setting. Moreover, it is
my view that to enlarge the number of protagonists in the theatre of
divorce frequently serves to obscure already muddied waters. Routinely introducing child advocates into these proceedings not only increases litigation expenses, but it further crowds the courtroom.
In arguing for a return to the adversarial model, Professor
Fineman writes, "[R]epresentation by competing adversaries is the
most reliable method of establishing the necessary facts upon which
to base subsequent decision making." This assertion ignores the
many travesties engendered by the adversarial system in the family
courts. For example, Fineman rails at length against the abuse of
social science data in divorce court. Yet, the most grievous abuse of
social science data is a by-product of this adversarial system, in
which each side presents the findings of a mental health expert, and,
mirabile dictu, the husband's hired gun supports the husband, while
the wife's hired gun supports the wife!
It has been open season on social workers since time immemorial. H.L. Mencken, that acerbic journalist, feasted on them. Woody
Allen, in the movie "Sleeper," described his worst nightmare-a
monster with the body of a crab and the head of a social worker. It
is the case that the work of mediators, who are most frequently social workers, warrants careful monitoring by family court judges, lest
its influence becomes overreaching. But Professor Fineman's churlish
and vitriolic diatribe against all social workers diminishes the seriousness of her work. Among many other charges she claims that
"[slocial workers are not neutral; they have a professional bias in
favor of a specific substantive result-shared parenting. That result
benefits their profession by creating the need for mediation and
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counseling." My view from the bench has afforded me the opportunity to observe that just as there are good attorneys and bad attorneys, there are good social workers and bad social workers. No profession has the corner on the market of self-interest.
The verso of the title page informs us that this book is a compilation of individual articles, and it certainly reads as such. What this
book needs.is a good editor. Professor Fineman's writings are repetitive and her language frequently convoluted, viz:
Perhaps ironically, equality has been a piercing and potent battle cry for male reactionaries who would lead us round once
again to the preservation of basic patriachal power. Used both
to attack the existing rules governing divorce and to demonstrate
the need for reforms, the ideology of equality supplied the theoretical underpinnings that shaped the formal content of the ultimately reformed rules. As a legal concept, equality gave the reform rules legitimacy, while it was simultaneously employed to
remove legitimacy from the 'unequal' rules that were to be replaced. Because of this, the new substantive rules are viewed
both as unbiased and as conferring equality before the law.
Only the most ardent devotee of divorce law is likely to slog
through this prose. And that's a pity, because the issues that Professor Fineman raises merit our attention.

